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Abstract— The development of mobile devices (CPU, memory, and storage) and the introduction of mobile networks (Ad-Hoc, 
Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and 3.5G) have opened new opportunities for next generation of mobile services. It becomes more convenience 
and desirable for mobile internet users to be connected everywhere. However, ubiquitous mobile access connectivity faces 
interoperation issues between wireless network providers and wireless network technologies. Although mobile users would like 
to get as many services as possible while they travel, there is a lack of technology to identify visited users in current foreign 
network authentication systems. This challenge lies in the fact that a foreign network provider does not initially have the 
authentication credentials of a mobile user. Existing approaches use roaming agreement to exchange authentication information 
between home network and foreign network. This paper proposes a roaming agreement-less approach designed based on our 
ubiquitous mobile access model. Our approach consist of two tokens, Passport (identification token) and Visa (authorisation 
token) to provide the mobile user with a flexible authentication method to access foreign network services. The security analysis 
indicates that our proposal is more suitable for ubiquitous mobile communication especially in roaming agreement-less 
environment. 
Index Terms— Authentication, Wireless communication, Protocol architecture, Mobile environments.  
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1 INTRODUCTION
HE development of mobile devices has grown sig-
nificantly over the last decade from a simple mobile 
phone to a pocket size-computing device with the 
capability to access the Internet via various wireless sys-
tems such as Wi-Fi and 3.5G networks. The advanced 
capabilities of mobile devices allow mobile users (MUs) to 
pay for products, surf the internet, buy and sell stocks, 
transfer money and manage bank accounts on the move 
without being restricted to a specific location. This fact 
keeps attracting many MUs to be connected wirelessly. It 
is estimated that half the world’s population now pays to 
use mobile devices[1].  
A MU always asks for a higher speed at lower prices, 
and demands to be  “Always Best Connected” [2]. The 
MU also wants a ubiquitous wireless coverage to network 
resources from anywhere, anytime. Yet, it is hard to 
achieve both high data rate and wide coverage at once. 
For a smaller coverage, it is easier to provide higher data 
rates. For instance, a 3.5G networks have a wider cover-
age but slower speeds; while Wi-Fi networks have higher 
speeds but smaller coverage. A key challenge in such het-
erogeneous networks is the possibility of roaming to ad-
ministrative domains with which a MU’s home domain 
does not have a pre-established roaming agreement [3]. 
Therefore ubiquitous wireless network coverage with 
high data rates is not feasible with a single technology 
and a single wireless provider. A heterogeneous wireless 
network will be composed of wireless networks of multi-
ple technologies operated by multiple network providers.  
Most of the current mobile devices are built with mul-
tiple wireless interfaces. They have built-in chipsets for 
IEEE 802.11 based Wireless LAN (WLAN) and interfaces 
for data connectivity using cellular networks. Nowadays, 
university campuses and company offices are supported 
by WLAN allowing their students or employees to have 
free access to the wireless networks. Hotspot operators 
offer wireless Internet in public places like cafés, restau-
rants, hotels and airports. A Wi-Fi community called FON 
has more than 250,000 hotspots worldwide [4], operated 
by individuals sharing their home Wi-Fi connection with 
other FON community members. An increasing number 
of wireless technologies and growing number of wireless 
providers of different sizes have in fact built a heteroge-
neous wireless network towards a worldwide coverage.  
Problem Statement. This growing number of wireless 
technologies and providers, as well as users' increasing 
need and desire to be connected and reached at all times, 
call for the development of ubiquitous wireless access. 
However, authenticating unknown users by foreign net-
work (FN) providers is still a challenge.  
Fig.1 shows that a MU cannot get network service 
from FN if there is no roaming agreement with the MU’s 
T
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home network (HN) for verification process. Tradition-
ally, for MUs to be able to roam into FNs, the FN and the 
MU’s HN must trust each other and have a roaming 
agreement established beforehand. However, HN cannot 
establish service agreement with all FNs. Therefore, MUs 
will not be able to get the service unless they could iden-
tify themselves to the FN. 
 
Fig. 1. Roaming agreement-less challenge. 
Our Approach and Contributions. This research pro-
poses the Passport-Visa technique based on our ubiqui-
tous mobile access model. The “Passport” is an authenti-
cation token that issued by identity provider (IdP: certifi-
cate authority or HN) to MU in order to identify and ver-
ify MU identity. The Passport in itself does not grant any 
access, but provides a unique binding between an identi-
fier and the subject. The “Visa” is an authorisation token 
that granted to a MU via a FN. The Visa token can be 
used as an access control to ban individual users. The 
contribution of this proposed approach is that: 
 
• It is wireless technology independence: it is not fea-
sible to achieve ubiquitous mobile access with sin-
gle wireless technology. Therefore, the authentica-
tion solution should enable access to the core net-
work regardless of the wireless technology. The 
proposed authentication solution is not designed 
for specific underlying wireless technology. It is 
aimed to be designed at the network layer of the 
OSI to avoid the differences in the link and physical 
layer. 
• Support direct negotiation: MUs should be able to 
choose and select the appropriate network based on 
direct negotiation of services and authentication. 
The proposed solution supports direct negotiate 
with the MU not with the IdP, which will increase 
the satisfaction of the user. 
• Support Open Marketplace (Home Network Inde-
pendent): MU should be able to access FN without 
the control of the HN. MUs can get the benefit of 
HN partners and more. They could get more net-
work services in area not covered by HN’s partners 
with full freedom of choice. 
• It is roaming agreement independence: A current 
solution by a visited MU’s cellular HN is based on a 
roaming agreement to establish trust with other cel-
lular network providers to extend services for their 
users. It is not likely to set up formal roaming 
agreements with every possible provider by MU’s 
HN.  Our approach does not depend on roaming 
agreement between FN provider and IdP. Alterna-
tively, FN provider use negotiation and trust deci-
sion to either authorize the MU or not.  
• The MU holds a global identification token (Pass-
port) to be authenticated everywhere by FNs. 
• The FN service owner grants the network service 
authorisation token (Visa) to MU, which support 
the access control role of FN. 
• FNs can use our technique to authenticate visited 
MU, although service level agreement between FN 
and MU’s HN does not exist. As our approach does 
not rely on static agreement in providing services, 
Passport-Visa technique will offer a flexible way to 
authenticate and authorise MU. 
• The proposed technique is lightweight for mobile 
devices as their side employs only symmetric keys, 
while the more powerful servers side used asym-
metric keys. 
Organization of this paper. The rest of this paper is 
structured as follows. This paper will start with an over-
view of the ubiquitous mobile access model, flexible au-
thentication architecture and the Passport and Visa proto-
cols (Section 2), where Passport acquisition, Visa acquisi-
tion, mobile service provision, Passport and Visa revoca-
tion are illustrated. We will then demonstrate the security 
analysis (Section 3), which followed by a review of exist-
ing approaches to the problem (Section 4).Finally, our 
conclusion of this paper will be presented (Section 5).  
2 THE PROPOSED MODEL 
2.1 Ubiquitous Mobile Access Model 
To achieve ubiquitous wireless access, MUs should be 
able to have a direct negotiation with potential FNs re-
garding service provision. IdPs are required to verify the 
MU’s identity and credentials. There should be more 
flexible ways to establish trust without relying on service 
agreements. Figure 2 below illustrates the proposed 
model based on direct negotiation and flexible trust.  MU 
is pre-registered with IdP to get identification token. In 
this model, MUs are able to negotiate directly with poten-
tial FN providers to get the authorization token. Also, FN 
providers are able to communicate directly with potential 
MUs and make trust decision whether or not to provide 
network service. For a FN provider to trust MU, IdP is 
used to verify the claimed identity of the MU. Certificate 
authority can be employed to establish trust with this IdP. 
The relationships between engaging parties can be de-
scribed as follow: 
• Trust: there are three type of trust in the proposed 
model. The first type is “No Trust”, this type can 
exist between MU and potential foreign network 
provider as a first step of communication. The sec-
ond type is “Partial Trust”, this type exists between 
FN and IdP.  The term partial trust means that there 
is no roaming agreement between these two enti-
ties. The third type is the full trust and this one ex-
ists between MU and IdP (after the registration 
process) and FN (after the authentication process). 
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Fig. 2. The Proposed Model. 
• Negotiation: a MU negotiates with prospective FN 
providers’ the available services. 
• Identification & Verification: Identification is the 
process of receiving credential from MU, and verifi-
cation is the process of checking credential with the 
user’s IdP. 
• Authorization: after verifying potential customer 
identity, the FN provider decides whether to pro-
vide the service or not, based on its policy on trust 
decision. The MU may need to reduce the level of 
service to the appropriate authentication credentials 
level s/he may be able to provide. After the first 
successful authentication, MU could access the FN 
provider resources using the issued authorization 
token without any further communication with IdP. 
2.2 Flexible Authentication Architecture  
In order to achieve a flexible way to authenticate and 
trust a MU, a Flexible Authentication Architecture (FAA) 
is introduced, it is based on three components namely 
negotiation, trust, and policy managers, as shown in Fig-
ure 19. The following subsections introduce these three 
components.  
 
Fig. 3. Flexible Authentication Architecture. 
2.2.1 Trust Manager 
Trust is an essential component required for coopera-
tion between ubiquitous mobile access entities. Without 
prior agreements, establishing trust among parties is the 
driving factor for inter-working. Without trust, there is no 
assurance that services will be delivered and paid for. 
Trust Manager will be responsible for making the trust 
decision in collaboration with Negotiation Manager based 
on the rules that are controlled by the Policy manager. 
Existing trust models will be used by Trust Manager in 
making trust decision. An overview of the trust manage-
ment, and decision concept is described below. 
Trust Management: Trust is a relationship between two 
parties, and trust management can be described from two 
points of view [5]: Firstly, it enables relying parties to 
make assessments and decisions regarding the depend-
ability of potential remote parties, which may involve 
transaction risk. Secondly, it allows parties to increase the 
level of trust and the reliability of their own, and appro-
priately represent and communicate them to other play-
ers.  
Trust decision: Trust decision can be defined as the level 
to which a given party is ready to depend on another 
party in a given situation with a feeling of security to 
some extent, although negative consequences are possible 
[5]. FN providers play as a relying party that depends on 
IdPs to trust MU. However, FN providers require an ap-
proach to trust IdPs in the same way. As the state of trust 
can change, the relying party uses assessment parameters 
to make the trust decision. Trust decision can be affected 
by a number of factors such as reputation, risk, impor-
tance, and tolerance level [6]. Other factors can also be 
considered such as utility (of possible outcomes), envi-
ronmental factors (law enforcement, contracts, security 
mechanisms etc.) and risk attitude (risk taking, risk 
averse, etc.) [5].  
2.2.2 Negotiation Manager 
Negotiation is an essential part in doing business as 
one negotiates in buying and selling. Negotiation is the 
protocol used by engaging parties to reach an agreement 
that meet every one’s interests, and can be done using a 
simple request/response protocol. Negotiation is needed 
when the selling service can vary along several parame-
ters, and when the provider is willing to offer a competi-
tive price. The parties want to agree on a number of val-
ues at which an exchange can take place. Negotiation 
Manager enables engaging parties to negotiate to achieve 
the following [7] goals: 
• Establish Trust: The two parties negotiate and agree 
on methods for identification and authentication to 
establish trust. With the mutual trust, FN provider 
ensures that the service will get paid and MU en-
sures that the FN provider is a legitimate and 
trusted provider. 
• Agree on Session Profile: The two parties negotiate 
and agree on per-session features, such as what 
type of QoS is provided for which services. Agree 
on pricing and other billing related features. 
• Agree on Session Security: The two parties negoti-
ate and agree on mechanisms for protecting their 
traffic. 
2.2.3 Policy Manager 
Engaging parties use policies to govern the trust and 
negotiation. Policy Manager maintains the rules that meet 
the objective of every party in the negotiation and trust 
decision factors with the involving risk. At an abstract 
level, before conducting the negotiation each party pre-
pares and specifies their own sets of policies that meet 
their own interests. The policies should include at least 
the following: 
• Trust policy: the identification and credentials that 
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can be trusted. 
• Identification, authentication, and authorization 
policies. 
• Other policies governing per-session features, such 
as QoS, security, and billing settings. 
2.3 Passport and Visa Protocol 
This technique can be used when there is no roaming 
agreement between FN and MU’s HN. It consists of two 
tokens Passport and Visa. The “Passport” is an authenti-
cation token that is issued by identity provider (IdP: HN 
or certificate authority) to MU in order to identify and 
verify MU identity. The Passport in itself does not grant 
any access, but provides a unique binding between an 
identifier and the subject. The “Visa” is an authorisation 
token that is granted to a MU via a FN. The Visa token 
can be used as an access control to ban individual users. 
The following are a set of protocols were developed to 
achieve the approach objective. 
2.3.1 Passport Acquisition 
This protocol will describe the MU registration process 
with HN (Passport issuer); by completing this protocol 
MU will receive a Passport (identification token). For a 
MU to get network services from a FN, this MU required 
to register with the HN to obtain a  Passport.  
The registration with the HN takes place offline. The 
registration with the HN occurs once and when com-
pleted, the HN issues a smart card (SC) to the MU. Every 
SC has a unique ID, which is combined with MU’s bio-
metric (such as finger print) to generate a symmetric mas-
ter Key ( 	
 denotes the shared key encryption be-
tween MU and HN).  Key master is manually distributed, 
shared and stored on both parties’ sides (HN and MU’s 
SC) directly after issuing the SC. The HN’s generate the 
MU’s   
   which is encrypted with the home net-
work’s public key (PK (X) denotes HN’s public key en-
cryption) and stored in the SC. The Passport is given as: 
 
  
   	 , !", #$%, , 	
, 
         &' , !", #$%, , 	
(( )          (1) 
 
In the Passport, &'  represents the digital signature 
of the Passport using the HN’s private key which can be 
verified using the public key. Inside the Passport, “” 
is the mobile user’s identity and “!"” is the Passport 
number. The “expiry” field corresponds to the Passport 
expiry date. Finally, the field “data” consists of all other 
relevant information such as type of Passport, type of 
MU, MU name, MU date of birth, date of issue, place of 
issue, issuer ID, and issuer name etc.  
2.3.2 Visa Acquisition 
A MU will receive the required Visa (authorisation to-
ken) from the FN after completing the identification and 
verification process successfully. When the MU has his 
Passport (authentication token) in hand, the authentica-
tion process can be started with the FN in order to obtain 
the required Visa. The protocol is demonstrated as fol-
lows: 
*+ , -. /   
 ,01!, , 2345
 , !", 2, 
                        6#, 78#91!, ""                             2( 
-. , <.:    >!, 01! , , 2345
   
                    , 2,  6#?, 21!, 	>! 1!(                   3( 
<. , -.: 	?A, BC, , 1!, &'>! A 
      , BC, , 1!((, 01! , BC1!, 1!, , 2>!345
 4( 
-. , *+: 7  
 ?, 01! , BC1!, 1!, , 2>! 345
 , 
 0EF1! 34G
? , "1!" 5( 
&	F>!  I	F>! ,   , 1!(    6( 
&	F1!  IA, 1!, , 1!, "", "1!"(  7( 
The protocol starts once a MU sends his  and 
the service Visa request in (2). The foreign network ID 
1!, MU’s random number , and MU’s timestamp are 
encrypted by the MU and HN session key &	F>!. The 
generation of MU and HN session key &	F>! is illus-
trated in (6), where three factors named: shared master 
key 	F>! , MU’ id, and HN’s id are hashed using one 
way hash function h(x). By computing this session key 
&	F>! a mutual authentication will be established be-
tween the MU and the HN. The FN’s id is encrypted to 
enable the HN to verify the , 1! with the one in the FN 
certificate and to make sure that it has not been modified 
by an attacker. The  used to authenticate the HN, and 
it is one of the factor of generating the MU and FN ses-
sion key &	F1! in (7). By computing this session key 
&	F1! a mutual authentication will be established be-
tween the MU and the FN. The !" is used by the FN 
in the verification process with the !"  that sent by the 
HN in (4). All the timestamps 2 , 21! , and 2>! are used 
to stop reply attack. The HN’s certificate 6# is sent to 
the FN for verification and establishing trust using certifi-
cate authority (CA). Another MU’s random number  "" 
is sent to FN to be used as a factor in generating the MU 
and FN session key &	F1! in (7). 
The FN forwards the encrypted Passport, 1!, , 2 
and adds its certificate  6#?, timestamp 21!, random 
number encrypted by HN’s public key 	>!1!(( to the 
HN in (3). The FN’s certificate 6#? is sent to the HN for 
verification and establishing trust using the certificate 
authority (CA). The FN’s random number 1! used to 
authenticate the HN and it is one of the factor of generat-
ing the MU and FN session key &EF1! in (7).  
After receiving the message from the FN, the HN en-
sures if the timestamps of MU 2 and FN 21! are valid. 
If one of them is not valid, the HN replies with un-fresh 
session and terminate the request. Otherwise, the HN 
checks the validity of FN certificate 6#? with the CA as 
a valid certificate as well as network provider. Then, the 
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HN decrypts the Passport with its private key and then 
verifies the signature using the HN’s public key. After the  
HN checks successfully the MU’s Passport is genuine and 
valid, it get the shared key 	F>!) and its relevant in-
formation such as the date of expiry. Then, the HN gener-
ates the session key SKPQFRS( for authentication and 
encryption between the MU and the HN. This session key 
will be used to decrypt the second part of the message 
01!,  , 23. The HN compares the FN’s ID in this 
massage with the one in the certificate to ensure the FN 
has not been changed. After verifying the FN, the HN 
decrypts the FN’s random number by its private key. The 
HN gets the FN’s random number 1!, FN’s ID from the 
certificate  1!, the indicator of the validity of FN 
BC1!, the MU’s random number  and its timestamp 
01!, BC1! , 1! ,  , 2>!3 and encrypt them  with the 
MU-FN session key &EF>!. Also, as the HN authenti-
cate the MU, the HN gets the MU’s Passport 
ber A, the indicator of the validity of MU BC, 
the MU’s random number , and the FN’s random 
number 1! (A, BC ,  , 1!(. The HN then com-
pute their digital signatures using its private key, then 
encrypt them using the FN’s public key. Then, the HN 
put the FN authentication part and the MU authentication 
part in one massage and sends it to the FN. 
Once the FN received the message from the HN, it de-
crypts its part using its private key and verifies it using 
the HN’s public key. If the FN received the validity of the 
Passport and checks its random number, the Visa will be 
generated 7  
 ? with the shared master key 	F1!.The FN 
encrypts the master key 	F1! using the session key in 
(7) and sends it back to the MU with the Visa. Further-
more, the FN sends a new random number "1!" for gen-
erating the session key. The Visa is defined as: 
7  
 ?  	?A, 7!", #$%, , 	
?, 
         &'? A, 7!", #$%, , 	
?(( )          8( 
After the MU receives the authorisation message from 
the HN through FN, the MU generate the session key in 
(6) and decrypt the message. The HN’s timestamps 2>!, 
random number  , foreign network ID 1!   correct-
ness will be checked. If they were incorrect, the Visa will 
be rejected, and if they were verified the Visa will be kept 
for future service request. The MU compute the MU-FN 
session key &EF1! to deycrpt the shared master key 
	F1!. The Visa is encrypted with the FN’s public key 
(PKV (X) denotes the FN’s public key encryption), which 
means that only the FN can decrypt it. The t A is the 
Passport number of the MU. The Visa number 7!"  is 
the unique identity of the Visa and the expiry is the Visa 
expiry date. The data field includes all detailed Visa in-
formation such as Visa type, number of access, duration 
of access, issuer place, issuer ID, issuer name, issued time, 
service type, service name, times of access. The signature 
of the FN  &'? in the Visa is used to stop a forged Visa. 
Before the Visa is sent, the FN stores the Visa information 
for future verifications. The following is an example:  
 
0A;  7!";  #$%;  valid3          (9) 
 
The #$% is the Visa expiry date. The field valid is set 
to FALSE once a Visa is revoked, otherwise it is set to 
TRUE.  
2.3.3 Mobile Service Provision 
This protocol illustrates how a MU can be granted 
network services from a FN in secure manner.  When the 
MU obtains a valid Visa, the MU can provide it to the FN 
for network service provision. The protocol is demon-
strated as follows: 
*+ , -. /  &#8#9, 7  
 ? , 0", 7!"3 45[
?             10( 
-. , *+: 01!", !"3 45"
? , 0&#B^#345"[
?         11( 
&	_
?  I&	
? , 7!", A(                                     12( 
&	"
?  I&	[
?, 	
?, "(                                         13( 
&	"_
?  I&	__
?, &	_
?, 1!"(                                    14( 
The protocol starts once the MU requests to validate 
the Visa to get access to the FN service. MU sends the 
Visa and encrypted its random number and Visa number 
with the first session key &	_
?. The first session key 
(demonstrated in (12)) is generated by using the hash 
function of three factors: last session key 	
?, Passport 
and Visa number(received with Visa). After the FN re-
ceives the service request, it decrypts the Visa with its 
private key and checks its validity with the FN’s public 
key. Then, it compares this signature to the one received. 
If they are identical, the Visa is considered as valid. Then, 
it gets the number of the Visa 7!"  and searches its da-
tabase to see if the Visa is used for the first time. The 
7!"  is to prove to the FN the knowledge of the Visa 
contents. However, the FN have to computes the &	_
? 
to verify 7!"  and to get the new random number ". 
The new random number will be used to generate the 
second session key &	"
? illustrated in (13).The second 
session key will be used by the FN to encrypt its random 
number 1!" and the Passport number A. Finally, the 
third session key will be generated &	"_
? using the 
new FN random number  1!", the first and second ses-
sion keys. By having the third session key in hand both 
parties know that mutual authentication has been real-
ized and the service can be started.  
2.3.4 Passport and Visa Revocation  
This protocol will be used to stop stolen Passport or 
Visa. If a Passport or Visa is considered to be revoked 
(e.g., the mobile user’s shared keys 	
 or 	
? ex-
pires or the MU notices the FN to revoke a Visa or the HN 
to revoke a Passport).  
The Passport revocation can be illustrated as: 
<. , -.: 	1! `  !", 8#BaE#,&' !", 8#BaE#(b                 (15)                                                                      
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The protocol starts when the HN sends the RevOke 
message (which has been encrypted with the FN’s public 
key and signed by the HN’s private key) to the corre-
sponding FN. The FN decrypts the message with its pri-
vate key and verifies the signature with the HN’s public 
key. The FN checks if the Passport number  !" is al-
ready stored. If not, it means that there is no Visa issued 
with this Passport number. If it was stored, it stores the 
revoked Passport information and updates the status of 
the Visa as RevOke. 
The Visa revocation can be illustrated as: 
*+ , -.: c A, 7!", 8#BaE#,  0A, 7!", 8#BaE#345[
?d45
?
       (16) 
When FN receives a RevOke message from MU, the 
FN decrypts the message with the last session key 
&	F1! then verifies that by decrypting the other part of 
the message with the first session key &	_F1! (illus-
trated in (12)).The FN updates the status of the Visa as 
RevOke. Once a MU requests network services, the FN 
checks if the Visa was revoked. If it is revoked the service 
request will be rejected.    
3 SYSTEM SECURITY ANALYSIS  
3.1 Logical proof by BAN Authentication logic 
The objective of our Passport-Visa mechanism is to 
provide authentication services for all parties engaged in 
the communication. Authentication protocols rely on 
network communication [8] and any  failed communica-
tion will allow an opponent to pretend to be an lawful 
node in running the protocol. Authentication logics are 
tools that can be employed to assess the trust relation-
ships in authentication protocols. The BAN logic will be 
utilized [9] to examine and verify the security of the Pass-
port and Visa protocols. The assumptions of initial beliefs 
of the engaging parties are illustrated below in order to 
examine our protocol logic: 
MU believes fresh (efg)              , FN believes fresh (efg)     
MU believes fresh (efg")       , FN believes fresh (efg")  
MU believes fresh (e"fg")       , FN believes fresh (e"fg")   
MU believes fresh (ehi)       , FN believes fresh (ehi)  
MU believes fresh (ehi")       , FN believes fresh (ehi") 
MU believes fresh (e"hi")       , FN believes fresh (e"hi") 
HN believes fresh (efg)      , HN believes fresh (ehi)     
MU believes fg     j     kllm ni       , HN believes fg     j     kllm ni 
MU believes fg     oj     klllm ni      , HN believes fg    oj     klllm ni 
 
MU believes fg     j     kllm hi        , FN believes fg      j     kllm hi  
MU believes fg     oj     klllm hi       , FN believes fg     oj     klllm hi 
MU believes fg     oj"     kllllm hi       , FN believes fg     oj"   klllm hi   
MU believes fg     oj"′     kllllm hi       , FN believes fg     oj"′   klllm hi  
                                  
MU believes (FN controls fg     j     kllm hi)      
FN believes fresh fg     j     kllm hi            
In the demonstrated believes, the three engaging par-
ties believe the freshness of rPQ. Both the FN and the MU 
believe the freshness of rpS and rPQ". Together the MU 
and the FN believe the freshness of the secret key MU     s     kllm FN 
and trust it is generated by the HN. Also, each party trusts 
its own shared key. 
The idealized form of the Visa acquisition and service 
provision protocols is below: 
M1: *+ , -.:	>! vw*+     5     kllm <.xy , 0345
           (17) 
M2: -. , <.:	>! vw*+     5     kllm <.xy                                   
   , 0345
 , 	>! 1!( (18) 
M3: , -.:	1!, 1!, &'>! , 1!(( , 
                    01!, 345
      (19) 
M4: -. , *+: 	1! vw*+     5     kllm -.xy , 0, 1!345
, 
   w*+     5     kllm -.x45
?  (20) 
M5: *+ , -.:	1! vw*+     5     kllm-.xy , 0"345[
?           (21) 
M6: FN , *+: 01!"345"
? , *+
    45"[     kllllm -.              
In the M1 message, the foreign network FN cannot sees 
	>! vw*+
    5     kllm <.xy and 03z5
 , instead it forwards them to the 
HN. When receiving the M2, the HN sees 	>! vw*+
    5     kllm <. xy 
, 03z5
 and  	<. -.(. So the HN can read the MU’s 
random number, the shared key , and get the random 
number 1! of the FN after decrypt the message. As the 
HN believes *+     45     klllm <., the HN believes the MU said 
*+     45     klllm <. and realize the HN believes MU said ( ). So 
the HN believes that it is the MU, not anyone else, who 
sent the message. The initial belief the HN believes fresh 
( ), so the HN believes that the MU believes fresh 
( ).  
Similarly, when receiving M3, we have the FN believes 
 , and  1!. So both the HN and the FN know the se-
crets  ,  and  1!.  
While MU receives M4, with the result that MU be-
lieves *+     5     kllm -.. Consequently, we can have the following 
result: MU believes FN said  and  1!. Since the FN 
believes *+     45     klllm -., we obtain the MU believes *+     45     klllm -.. 
This means that MU believes that *+     5     kllm -. is the shared 
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secret key between the MU and the FN.  
At this stage, MU and FN are mutually authenticated. 
The last message, M5, is specifically used for the new ses-
sion key agreement. In this message the FN believes fresh  
" and the FN sees &	_F1! the first session key. Fi-
nally, it is M6 where both the FN and the MU believes 
*+     45"     kllllm -. and *+     45"[     kllllm -. which are the second and third 
session keys respectively. 
In the following we will summarize the previous for-
mal analysis with natural language as follows. Since the 
Passport is encrypted by the HN and signed by the HN, 
only the HN can decrypted through its private key and 
verify it using its public key. After that, the HN can get 
the MU’s shared key and compute the session key by 
hashing with the ID of both the MU and the FN. This ses-
sion key will decrypt the random number  . As the 
Visa is encrypted by the FN’s public key, only FN can 
decrypt it. Once MU receives the shared key KPQFpS from 
the FN, both the MU and the FN believe that KPQFpS is a 
shared secret key between them. They trust each other 
and use this key to generate their session keys. When the 
FN receives this Visa, it can get the shared key KPQFpS 
stored in the Visa and use the random numbers, Passport 
and Visa numbers to computes the first, second and third 
session keys. Both the MU and the FN contribute a ran-
dom number and generate alone the new session key (SK) 
for the use in the current session. 
3.2 Security Analysis 
As a limitation of the BAN logic that it cannot deal 
with all security flaws [10], we are to consider some of the 
potential attacks in order to analyse security of the pro-
posed protocol.  
1) Forge Passport-Visa: a valid signature cannot be gen-
erated by external attackers in the name of the HN or 
FN. So it is impossible for them to fabricate or fake 
Passport or Visa. As the MU’s Visa can only be veri-
fied by the FN, therefore only the FN can know the se-
cret shared key 	
? of the MU and retrieve the 
random numbers.Without the shared key and the ran-
dom numbers the attacker cannot generate the session 
key &	
?. 
 
2) Mutual authentication: In the mobile service provision 
phase, the MU sends a message that consist of two 
part: Visa, and the encrypted new random number 
". The FN decrepts the Visa with it is public key 
and get the shared key. Also as the FN signed the 
Visa, so it can check the validation of the Visa. The FN 
use the previous session key with A, 7!"  to 
generate the first session key which will be used to 
decrept the second part of the message and get the 
new random number. The shared master key with the 
first session key and " will be used to generate the 
second session key. By decrypting the FN message, 
the MU can get the FN’s random number. Now, both 
parties are able to generate the third session key and 
mutual authenticate each other.   
 
3) Replay and man-in-the-middle attacks: An attacker 
may sniff a valid Visa, however the K{|V, Pass},
and VisaScannot be got as they are encrypted in the 
Visa. The only party that can get the 	
?, 
Pass}, and VisaS from the Visa is the FN. 
 
4) Key freshness: only the MU and the FN know the 
shared key 	
?. In addition, it not used in any 
communication. In every service provision the new 
session key is generated, but it is valid just in that cur-
rent session. This key is established by contributing 
the random numbers of both the MU and the FN. So 
the key freshness is guaranteed. 
4 RELATED WORK 
There are number related works in the area of ubiqui-
tous mobile access authentication. Their strengths and 
limitations will be discussed.  
There are a number of proposals that based on the 
ticket model [8, 11-17].  One of them is Kerberos [18-22] 
the famous ticket model which used for network authen-
tication and control access to network services. In Kerbe-
ros, tickets have a limited life time which means it should 
be used for the current session only. This will involve 
more loads in the ticket server. Also, the key distribution 
centre (KDC) in Kerberos maintains all the shared keys 
for every registered party. In our proposal, the Visa can 
be used multiple times to access FN unless the Visa is 
expired or met the specific access number. The security of 
the Visa can be maintained by generating new fresh ses-
sion key for every session using the random numbers. 
Also, both HN and FN do not require to store the shared 
key of MUs as the can be obtained from the Passport and 
the Visa. 
In this inspiring paper [8] Lei, Quintero and Pierre pre-
sented an reusable tickets for accessing mobile services. In 
their proposal a lightweight computational symmetric 
keys are used on the mobile device side to support the 
limited capabilities of MD.  The major difference between 
this work and our proposal is that, in their protocol FN 
does not have a control over granting the authorisation 
token, as the tickets are approved by the ticket server. 
Therefore, their approach will not work in case there is no 
service level agreement with the potential FN. For exam-
ple, a MU wants to access network services from new FN 
that not yet establish service agreement with ticket server 
or the FN is not large enough to be approved by the ticket 
server. In the Passport-Visa approach the FN has a full 
control wither to grant an authorisation access (Visa) to 
this individual MU or not. This approach give more free-
dom for MU in choosing the service provider based on 
direct negotiation of the services, identification (Passport), 
and authorisation (Visa). In this paper the FN is an inde-
pendent party and it does not require service level 
agreement with MU’s HN to provide the network ser-
vices. 
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Butty´an and Hubaux [23] have proposed a model 
based on the introduction of customer care agencies 
(CCA) and a ticket based mechanism for all kinds of mo-
bile services. The goal of their model is to enable MUs to 
choose their service providers in a more flexible way, 
handle payments on behalf of the user, and take care of 
protecting the user’s privacy by the assistance of cus-
tomer care agency. The problem with this model is simi-
lar to the previous work where the CCA act as a broker 
where every service provider should establish a service 
agreement to be accessible to MUs. This solution does not 
support the open market environment as MUs depend on 
CCA to access network providers, and there is no direct 
negotiation between MUs and FN providers. Another 
issue that the CCA require the MU to generate session 
key using Diffie-Hellman scheme. It is difficult to be 
computed by a limited resources device.  
Akyildiz and Mohanty [24] have proposed an Archi-
tecture for ubiquitous Mobile Communications (AMC). 
Their aim is to provide ubiquitous high-data rate services 
to MUs by integrating heterogeneous wireless systems. 
AMC eliminates the need for direct roaming agreements 
among network providers by using a third party network 
interoperating agent (NIA). The NIA acts as a broker, and 
it requires network providers to have pre-established 
roaming agreements. This solution does not support the 
open market environment as MUs depend on NIA to ac-
cess network providers, and there is no direct negotiation 
between MUs and FN providers.  
Droma and Ganchev [25-27] have proposed a Con-
sumer-centric Business Model (CBM) for wireless ser-
vices. They argue that their model is a better alternative to 
the subscriber based model (SBM). In the CBM model, 
entities should have business agreement only with the 
third-party authentication, authorization, and accounting 
(3P-AAA) service provisions. The 3P-AAA-SPs are inde-
pendent entities and not wireless access network provid-
ers (ANPs). This research has some common aims with 
this project research such as ubiquitous wireless access 
and more open marketplace. However, the 3P-AAA-SP 
works as a broker and it requires network providers to 
have pre-established service agreement.  
Shi et al. [28] have introduced Service Agent (SA) to 
the WLAN/cellular integrated network architecture to 
improve service flexibility and deal with the roaming 
agreement issue when the number of WLAN operators is 
large. The SA provides cellular network and WLAN with 
one-for-all roaming agreement so that one-to-one roam-
ing agreements are no longer needed. In their proposed 
service model, the MU does not have to be a customer of 
any physical network operator. The SA can provide cellu-
lar/WLAN integrated service itself. This approach has 
the same limitation of the broker model as well as it is 
dependent on Wi-Fi and cellular network technologies 
only. 
Matsunaga et al. [29] have proposed a single sign-on 
(SSO) authentication architecture that confederates 
WLAN service providers through trusted IdPs. They ar-
gue that the dynamic selection of authentication method 
and IdP will play a key role in confederating public wire-
less LAN service providers under different trust levels 
and with alternative authentication schemes. In their im-
plementation they used two different industry standard 
single sign-on authentication schemes in public wireless 
LANs: RADIUS and Liberty Architecture. A client-side 
policy engine enables the user to select which of the alter-
nate single sign on authentication schemes to use. The 
first limitation in this approach is the dependence in 
roaming agreement between network providers and IdPs, 
which may limit the MU roaming freedom. The second 
limitation is the dependency on a single wireless technol-
ogy. Lastly, it is limited to web-based authentication us-
ing cookies [30].  
Sastry et al. [31, 32] proposed to keep the Wi-Fi HN as 
the actual network provider even in the visiting network 
by creating a tunnel between FNs and HN to answer all 
the MU service requests directly by the HN. Their aim is 
to provide a roaming across wireless LAN that eliminates 
the security concerns of a FN. However, the MU is re-
stricted to roam across limited FNs that have roaming 
agreements with its HN, which limits the freedom of se-
lecting the most appropriate network. This approach also 
is not efficient as it forward the MU traffic to the far away 
HN which involve high latency and increase the network 
traffic. 
Bahl et al. [33] have proposed the CHOICE network 
architecture and its underlying  protocol  PANS (Protocol 
for Authorization and Negotiation of  Services). Their 
goal is to globally authenticate users and  securely  con-
nects  them  to  the  Internet  via  a  high-speed  wireless 
LAN. In their work they use Microsoft Passport as their 
global authenticator. To gain access to the network, the 
user should authenticate himself/herself with the global 
authenticator obtaining a key from the PANS authorizer. 
However, this approach is wireless technology depend-
ent. Also, the global authenticator act as a broker which 
requires all WLAN providers to have a pre-established 
service agreement. Furthermore, using a simple username 
and a password as in Microsoft Passport is a weak au-
thentication. 
Chakravorty et al. [34] proposed a mobile bazaar 
(MoB) , an open market architecture for collaborative 
wide-area wireless services by using reputation manage-
ment and third party accounting and billing. Their ap-
proach is based on short-term transient access network 
resource reselling by the network’s subscribers to other 
users using an ad hoc network type solution. Their aim is 
to provide the MU with network access and freedom to 
choose a better connection (high bandwidth) in a FN do-
main by trading with FN users. An available idle terminal 
may act as an access node (i.e., effectively as an ad hoc 
wireless router) to provide access, directly or via a multi-
hop link, to wireless communications resources such as a 
3G cellular network, and receive payment for this service. 
The limitation of this approach is the dependency on FN’s 
users availability in trading and accessing the network. 
Fu et al. [35] have proposed in fly partnership negotia-
tions to achieve spontaneous and dynamic roaming 
agreements using policy based negotiations for heteroge-
neous network providers. Their approach aims to elimi-
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nate manually set up pre-established formal roaming 
agreements, which is a costly and time-consuming proc-
ess. They argue for the need to establish on the fly roam-
ing agreement to optimize the network providers’ coop-
eration. However, this approach is based on the central-
ized model, which depends on the HN for accessing FNs. 
And there is no direct negotiation with the MU. 
Shin et al. [30, 36] argue that centralized authentication 
approaches are inefficient as the HN participates in each 
authentication process, causing high latency. They have 
proposed a chained method of distributed authentication 
for internetwork. The role of HN authentication has been 
limited to the first visited network, where the rest relies 
on the previous visited network for authentication. This 
approach relies on the collaboration between adjacent 
networks and the level of trust and requires service 
agreement between them. Also, there is no direct negotia-
tion between a MU and FNs.  
Tuladhar et al.[3] have proposed proof tokens authen-
tication architecture and protocol. It is similar to the pre-
vious approach (Chained Authentication), as it reduces 
the need for HN authentication by making use of the pre-
vious trusted visited network to authenticate the MU. In 
their approach, they tried to solve two problems. The first 
problem is the limited roaming agreement of HN with 
FNs, and they propose to allow MUs to access the part-
ners of previously visited networks by that MU. The sec-
ond problem is authentication delay, which they identi-
fied as a major cause for high latency, and propose the 
collaboration between adjacent networks. However, this 
approach still relies on roaming agreement for authentica-
tion, and does not support a direct negotiation with the 
MU. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper argued for the need of a flexible way to au-
thenticate mobile users in ubiquitous wireless access en-
vironment. We proposed a roaming agreement-less ap-
proach as a practical solution to provide MU with a flexi-
ble way to authenticate themselves outside the HN part-
ners’ domain with direct negotiation with FN provider. 
The FNs have full control over the authorisation process. 
The aim of this paper is to enable MU to access more 
wireless FN providers without relying on HN’s roaming 
agreements. The security analysis indicates that our Pass-
port and Visa proposals provide a secure authentication 
mechanism for ubiquitous wireless access environment. 
Our proposed technique will provide MU with more 
network services from FN domains in a secure manner. 
As further work, we are currently working to enhance 
the Passport and Visa protocols security and usability. A 
very promising technique we are going to analyse to be 
adapted in our approach is the limited-used key theory 
[37-39]. The main idea behind this theory is one-time used 
symmetric cryptographic keys that improve the security 
of the cryptographic system significantly.  The dynamic 
keys system encrypt every message with a different key, 
therefore even if the attacker finds out the key for one 
packet it still cannot read the whole message as the at-
tacker needs to find out the other packets keys. 
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